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Abstract
Device-independent randomness generation and quantum key distribution protocols rely on a
fundamental relation between the non-locality of quantum theory and its random character. This
relation is usually expressed in terms of a trade-off between the probability of guessing correctly
the outcomes of measurements performed on quantum systems and the amount of violation of a
given Bell inequality. However, a more accurate assessment of the randomness produced in Bell
experiments can be obtained if the value of several Bell expressions is simultaneously taken into
account, or if the full set of probabilities characterizing the behavior of the device is considered.
We introduce protocols for device-independent randomness generation, secure against classical side
information, that rely on the estimation of an arbitrary number of Bell expressions or even directly
on the experimental frequencies of measurement outcomes. Asymptotically, this results in an optimal
generation of randomness from experimental data (as measured by the min-entropy), without having
to assume beforehand that the devices violate a specific Bell inequality.
1 Introduction
In recent years, researchers have uncovered a fundamental relationship between the non-locality of quan-
tum theory and its random character. This relationship is usually formulated as follows. Consider two
(or generally k) separated quantum devices accepting, respectively, classical inputs x1 and x2 and out-
putting classical outputs a1 and a2. Let p = {p(a1a2 |x1x2)} denote the set of joint probabilities describing
how the devices respond to given inputs, from the point of view of a user who can only interact with
the devices through the input-output interface, but who has no knowledge of the inner workings of the
devices. Suppose that given p, the expectation value of a certain Bell expression f , such as the Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) expression [1], equals f [p]. Then, it is in principle possible to compute a
lower bound on the randomness generated by the devices, as quantified by the min-entropy—the negative
logarithm of the maximal probability of correctly guessing the values of future outputs. This bound on
the min-entropy holds for any observer, including those having an arbitrarily precise description of the
inner workings of the devices, and depends only on information derived from the resulting input-output
behavior through the quantity f [p]. In principle, this bound can be computed numerically for any given
Bell expression f . For certain Bell expressions, such as the CHSH expression, it can also be determined
analytically.
This relation between the non-locality of quantum theory and its randomness is at the basis of various
protocols for device-independent (DI) randomness generation (RNG) [2, 3] and quantum key distribution
(QKD) [4, 5]. The theoretical analysis of such protocols presents us with an extra challenge in that the
probabilistic behavior p of the devices is not known in advance and may vary from one measurement
run to the next. This implies that bounds on the randomness as a function of f [p] have to be adapted
to rely instead on the value of the Bell expression f estimated from experimental data. Some DIRNG
and DIQKD protocols, and their security analyses, are reliant on specific Bell inequalities (usually the
CHSH inequality) [6–9] or certain families of Bell inequalities [10–12], while others may be adapted to
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arbitrary Bell inequalities [3, 13–17]. However, to our knowledge all DIRNG and DIQKD protocols in
the literature require that a single Bell inequality be chosen in advance and its experimental violation
estimated (one exception is [18], where two fixed Bell expressions are used). The length and secrecy of
the final key will then depend on the observed violation of the chosen inequality.
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out in [19, 20] that the fundamental relation between the randomness
and non-locality of quantum theory does not necessarily need to be expressed in terms of a specific
Bell inequality. It is in principle possible, at least numerically, to bound the probability of guessing
correctly the outputs of a pair of quantum devices directly from the knowledge of the joint input-output
probabilities p. Indeed, the amount of violation f [p] of a given Bell inequality captures the non-local
behavior of the devices only partially, and better bounds on the min-entropy can be obtained if all the
information about the devices’ behavior is taken into account.
This observation raises the following question: can one devise a device-independent RNG or QKD
protocol that does not rely on the estimation of any a priori chosen Bell inequality, but which instead
takes directly into account all the data generated by the devices?
There are various reasons for introducing protocols of this type. First, as already mentioned, the
entire set of data generated by the devices can provide more information than the violation of a specific
Bell inequality, and may therefore potentially allow for more efficient protocols. Second, the choice of a
Bell inequality may have a deep influence on the amount of randomness that can be certified: as shown
in [21] there are devices for which the amount of randomness, as computed from the CHSH inequality,
is arbitrarily small, but is maximal if computed using another Bell inequality. Third, even if a set of
quantum devices have been specifically designed to maximize the randomness according to a specific
Bell inequality, the optimal extraction of randomness from noisy versions of such devices, say because of
degradation of the devices with time, will typically rely on other Bell inequalities [19, 20, 22]. Finally,
suppose that one is given a set of quantum devices without any specification of which Bell inequality
they are expected to violate. Can one nevertheless directly use them in a protocol and obtain a non-zero
random string or shared key, without testing their behavior beforehand?
We show here that it is indeed possible to devise DIRNG protocols which exploit more information
than the estimated violation of a single Bell inequality, particularly, DIRNG protocols which exploit the
full set of frequencies obtained (i.e., the entire set of estimates of the behavior p). Specifically, we intro-
duce a DIRNG protocol whose security holds against an adversary limited to classical side information,
or equivalently, with no long-term quantum memory. (Note that such a level of security may well be
sufficient for all practical purposes [14, 15].) Technically, our protocol is obtained by generalizing the
security analysis introduced in [14, 15] and combining it with the semidefinite programming techniques
introduced in [19, 20] for lower-bounding the randomness based on the full set of probabilities p (which
cannot be directly applied to experimental data).
We start in Section 2 by briefly presenting the theoretical framework of our work, its main assump-
tions, and the notation used throughout the paper. In Sections 3 to 5 we present our main mathematical
results. In Section 3 we present the main theorem of the paper and explain in detail how to put a DI
bound on the randomness produced when measuring a Bell device n times in succession, given that we
have a way to bound the single-round randomness as a function of the Bell expectation, and given that
we can estimate the Bell expectation with some confidence. These two sub-procedures are respectively
presented in Sections 4 and 5 for the general case of an arbitrary number of Bell expressions. Combining
these two sub-procedures with the general approach of Section 3 immediately yields a DIRNG protocol,
whose various steps are summarized in Section 6. In Section 7 we discuss in detail the main features of
our protocol, and illustrate these with a numerical example. We end with some concluding remarks and
open questions in Section 8.
2 Behaviors and Bell expressions
In the following we will refer to a Bell set up, that is to say, k separated “black” boxes (quantum devices
whose inner workings are unknown), as a Bell device. Each box i can receive an input xi upon which it
produces an output ai, with xi and ai taking values in some finite sets Xi and Ai, respectively, where
without loss of generality we assume that the set of outputs Ai does not depend on the input xi. We write
x = (x1, . . . , xk) and a = (a1, . . . , ak) for the k-tuple of inputs and outputs, and write X = X1× · · · ×Xk
and A = A1 × · · · × Ak for the set of all possible k-tuples of inputs and outputs. Note that we use a
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roman (upright) type for the inputs and outputs of a single box and an italic type for the joint inputs
and outputs of all k boxes.
The behavior of a single-round use of this Bell device can be characterized by the |A| × |X | joint
probabilities p(a | x), which we can arrange into a vector p ∈ R|A|×|X|. We denote by Q ⊂ R|A|×|X| the
set of behaviors p which admit a quantum representation, i.e., the set of behaviors such that there exist
a k-partite quantum state and local measurements yielding the outcomes a with probability p(a |x) when
performing the measurements x. It is well-known that the set Q can be approximated from its exterior
(from outside the set) by a series of semidefinite programs (SDP) using the NPA hierarchy [23].
We define a Bell expression as a vector f ∈ R|A|×|X| with components f(a, x). The Bell expression
f defines a linear form on the set of behaviors p through
f [p] =
∑
a,x
f(a, x)p(a | x) . (1)
We refer to f [p] as the expectation of f with respect to the behavior p.
We consider here a framework in which the information we have about a Bell device is not necessarily
given by the full behavior p, but possibly only by the expectation of one or more Bell expressions. In the
following, we thus assume that t Bell expressions fα (α = 1, . . . , t) have been selected. (The certifiable
randomness will depend on this initial choice of Bell expressions; we discuss this issue later.) We denote
by f = (f1, . . . , ft) these t Bell expressions and by f [p] = (f1[p], . . . , ft[p]) their expectations with respect
to the behavior p. As an example, in a bipartite scenario, we might only know the value of the CHSH
expression, in which case t = 1 and there is a single f defined by f(a, x) = (−1)a1+a2+x1x2 . But the
framework is also applicable when f [p] corresponds to the full set p of probabilities. One simply needs to
consider |A|× |X | expressions, one for each pairing (a, x), which are defined by fa,x(a′, x′) = δ(a,x),(a′,x′),
so that fa,x[p] = p(a | x).
Of course, in a DI protocol, we are not actually given f [p]; we must instead estimate it by performing
sequential measurements. We are thus led to consider a Bell device which is used n times in succession.
We write ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) and ~a = (a1, . . . , an) for the corresponding sequence of inputs and outputs
and ~xj = (x1, . . . , xj) and ~aj = (a1, . . . , aj) for the sequences of inputs and outputs up to, and including,
round j.
We write P (~a | ~x) for the conditional probabilities of obtaining the sequence of outputs ~a given a
certain sequence of inputs ~x. Note that we use an upper-case P to denote the n-round behavior of the
boxes and lower-case p’s for single-round behaviors. We assume that the Bell device is probed using
inputs ~x distributed according to a probability distribution Π(~x). We will consider, in particular, the
case where at each round the inputs are selected according to identical and independent distributions
pi(x), so that Π(~x) =
∏n
j=1 pi(xj) (though this condition can actually be slightly relaxed in the results
that follow). The full (non-conditional) n-round probabilities are thus given by P (~a, ~x) = P (~a | ~x) Π(~x).
We denote by PAX and PA|X the distributions corresponding to the probabilities P (~a, ~x) and P (~a | ~x),
respectively.
The only assumption we make about the Bell device is that at each round it is characterized by a
joint entangled quantum state and a respective set of local measurement operators for each box. Each
set of local measurement operators can depend on the past inputs and outputs of all k boxes (separated
boxes can thus freely communicate between measurement rounds), but does not depend on future inputs
(inputs are thus selected independently of the state of the device) or inputs of the k−1 other boxes in the
same round. Mathematically, this means that we can write P (~a | ~x) = ∏nj=1 P (aj | xj ,~aj−1, ~xj−1), and
that the (single-round) behavior at round j given the past inputs and outputs ~xj−1 and ~aj−1, defined
as p~aj−1,~xj−1(aj | xj) = P (aj | xj ,~aj−1, ~xj−1), should be a valid no-signaling quantum behavior, i.e.,
p~aj−1,~xj−1 ∈ Q.
We assume that the internal behavior of the boxes may be classically correlated with a system held
by an adversary. Formally, these correlations and the adversary’s knowledge can be represented through
the joint probabilities P (~a, ~x, e), where e denotes the adversary’s classical side information. However, in
order to keep the notation simple, we do not explicitly include e in the following. All the reasonings that
follow would nevertheless hold, with only minor modifications, if the adversary’s classical side information
e were explicitly taken into account. This can be understood by comparing our proofs with those in [14].
Alternatively, e can be formally viewed as an initial input x0 = e.
In the following, we sometimes adopt a terminology where the k-tuples x and a are referred to as the
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input and output of (a single-round use of) the Bell device (though of course each consists of the inputs
and outputs, respectively, of all k boxes).
3 A general procedure for DIRNG against classical side-infor-
mation
In this section, we show how to quantify the randomness produced by n sequential uses of the Bell device
based on the Bell expressions f . We follow the approach introduced in [3, 14]. This approach relies on
two essential sub-procedures: a first sub-procedure to bound the randomness of single-round behaviors
and a second sub-procedure to estimate a certain quantity involving the Bell expressions f . Given these
two ingredients, the single-round randomness bound can, through some simple algebra, be adapted to
the n-round scenario and related to the actual data obtained in the Bell experiment.
We provide a macro-level description of this approach, which relies only on certain general mathe-
matical properties that these two basic sub-procedures must satisfy, but not on any specifics as to how
to implement them. We will present explicit ways to carry out these sub-procedures in the next two
sections.
Intuitively, the output of the Bell device exhibits randomness for some choice of input ~x if there is
no corresponding outcome that is certain to happen, i.e., if P (~a | ~x) < 1 for all ~a ∈ An. Equivalently,
we can express this condition by saying that the surprisals − log2 P (~a | ~x) are bounded away from zero:
− log2 P (~a | ~x) > 0 for all ~a ∈ An. Our first aim will thus be to lower-bound these surprisals without
making any assumptions regarding the Bell device’s behavior apart from the ones stated in Section 2.
We will then see how to turn this bound into a more formal statement in terms of min-entropy.
To bound the n-round randomness, we assume the existence of a function H which bounds the single-
round surprisal − log2 p(a | x) as a function of the Bell expectations f [p]. This is our first ingredient.
We actually require this function to non-trivially bound the surprisals − log2 p(a | x) corresponding to a
certain subset Xr ⊆ X of all possible inputs. This is because for certain behaviors, some inputs x lead to
less predictable outputs than those resulting from other inputs, and we would therefore prefer to focus
on these inputs only. (As will be elaborated on later, the amount of certifiable randomness generally
depends on the choice of Xr.) Formally, the function H, on which our results are based, is defined as
follows.
Definition 1. Let f [Q] = {f [p] : p ∈ Q} be the set of Bell expectation vectors compatible with at least
one quantum behavior. A function H : f [Q]→ [0, log2 |A|] is a randomness-bounding (RB) function if it
satisfies the following properties:
1. mina∈A,x∈Xr
(− log2 p(a | x)) ≥ H(f [p]) for all p ∈ Q.
2. H(f [p]) is a convex function of its argument:
H
(
q f [p1] + (1− q) f [p2]
) ≤ qH(f [p1]) + (1− q)H(f [p2]) (2)
for any 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and any p1, p2 ∈ Q.
We will also need to compute a lower bound on H(f [p]) for all behaviors p ∈ Q such that f [p] ∈ V
for some arbitrary region V ⊆ Rt. We thus extend our definition of H to sets, such that
H(V) ≤ inf{H(f [p]) : f [p] ∈ f [Q] ∩ V} . (3)
When f [Q] ∩ V = ∅, we define H(V) = 0. Furthermore, we define η to be a constant such that η ≥
η∗ = maxp∈QH(f [p]). (In case η∗ is hard to compute, we may always use η = log2|A|.) We discuss the
intuitive interpretation of H and its properties in Section 5.
Given a RB function H, we can now easily lower-bound the n-round surprisals:
Lemma 1. Let H be a RB function. Then, for any (~a, ~x) and any Bell device behavior PA|X
− log2 P (~a | ~x) ≥ nH
 1
n
n∑
j=1
f
[
p~aj−1,~xj−1
]− ν(~x)η , (4)
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where
ν(~x) =
n∑
j=1
1X\Xr (xj) (5)
is the number of xj in ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) which do not belong to the set Xr.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof follows essentially the same steps as the proof of Lemma 1 in [14]. The
main differences are (a) that we express the bound eq. (4) as a function of t Bell expressions, instead of a
single Bell expression, and (b) that the bound considers explicitly only the randomness from the inputs
in Xr.
From our assumptions regarding the Bell device, it follows that for any (~a, ~x) we can write
− log2 P (~a | ~x) = − log2
n∏
j=1
p~aj−1,~xj−1(aj | xj) =
n∑
j=1
− log2 p~aj−1,~xj−1(aj | xj). (6)
Each term in the sum such that xj ∈ Xr can be bounded by H(f [p~aj−1,~xj−1 ]) according to the definition of
the functionH. If xj /∈ Xr, it is certainly the case that − log2 p~aj−1,~xj−1(aj |xj) ≥ 0 ≥ H(f [p~aj−1,~xj−1 ])−η.
We can thus write
− log2 P (~a | ~x) ≥
n∑
j=1
H(f [p~aj−1,~xj−1 ])− ν(~x)η (7)
≥ nH
 1
n
n∑
j=1
f
[
p~aj−1,~xj−1
]− ν(~x)η, (8)
where in the last line we have exploited the convexity of H.
Lemma 1 tells us how to bound the surprisals − log2 P (~a | ~x) as a function of 1n
∑n
j=1 f [p~aj−1,~xj−1 ],
which can be understood as an n-round average Bell expectation, where the average is taken conditioned
on past inputs and outputs at each preceding round. This quantity, however, is not directly observable.
This leads us to introduce the following definition of a confidence region, which is the second ingredient
needed in our approach.
Definition 2. A 1−  confidence region V(~a, ~x, ) for 1n
∑n
j=1 f [p~aj−1,~xj−1 ] is a subset of Rt such that,
according to any distribution PAX ,
Pr
 1
n
n∑
j=1
f
[
p~aj−1,~xj−1
] ∈ V(~a, ~x, )
 ≥ 1−  . (9)
We denote by V = {(~a, ~x) : 1n
∑n
j=1 f [p~aj−1,~xj−1 ] ∈ V(~a, ~x, )} the set of input-output sequences such
that 1n
∑n
j=1 f [p~aj−1,~xj−1 ] belongs to the confidence region V.
(Note that in general V explicitly depends on ~a and ~x, although notation-wise this dependence is some-
times left implicit.) In other words, for small  and large n, knowing the outcomes (~a, ~x) of n rounds of
measurement, one can determine V = V(~a, ~x, ) and assert with high confidence that 1n
∑n
j=1 f [p~aj−1,~xj−1 ]
is somewhere in V, even though its exact value cannot be deduced from (~a, ~x) alone. The assertion is
false if and only if (~a, ~x) /∈ V , which occurs with a probability smaller than  by definition.
Combining eq. (8) with this definition immediately implies the following:
Lemma 2. Let V be a 1−  confidence region according to Definition 2. Then for any (~a, ~x) ∈ V
− log2 P (~a | ~x) ≥ nH(V)− ν(~x)η . (10)
Lemma 2 tells us that the surprisal associated to the event ~a given ~x is lower-bounded by a function
of (~a, ~x), except for a subset of “bad” events {(~a, ~x) /∈ V }.
One way to deal with these bad events is simply to pretend that the boxes are characterized by
a slightly modified behavior P˜ that yields a new “abort” output ~a =⊥ when one of the bad events is
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obtained (while according to P , the probability of ~a =⊥ is zero). Effectively, P˜ can be thought of as post-
processed version of the physical behavior P . Though this post-processed version cannot be achieved
in practice by the user of the devices (since he does not know the set of bad events), it is well-defined
physically (it could for instance be implemented by an adversary having a perfect knowledge of P ). The
relevant point is that since the probability of these bad events is extremely low for sufficiently small ,
the behaviors P and P˜ are, as shown below, close in variation distance, and analyzing the security using
P˜ instead of P thus yields the same result up to vanishing error terms. (See [14] for a more detailed
discussion.)
Lemma 3. There exists a behavior P˜A|X such that P˜AX = P˜A|X×ΠX and PAX = PA|X×ΠX are -close
in variation distance, i.e.,
d(P˜AX , PAX) =
1
2
∑
~a,~x
|P˜ (~a, ~x)− P (~a, ~x)| ≤  , (11)
and such that for any ~a 6=⊥
− log2 P˜ (~a | ~x) ≥ nH(V)− ν(~x)η . (12)
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof of this lemma is analogous to that of Lemma 3 in [14]. Define P˜A|X as
P˜ (~a | ~x) =

P (~a | ~x) if (~a, ~x) ∈ V,
0 if (~a, ~x) /∈ V and ~a 6=⊥,∑
~a:(~a,~x)/∈V P (~a | ~x) if ~a =⊥ .
(13)
Eq. (11) follows immediately, and Lemma 2 implies eq. (12).
We can now put a bound on the randomness of the Bell device as follows. Let λ denote the event
that nH(V) − ν(~x)η is greater than or equal to some a priori fixed threshold Hthr. Conditioned on λ
occurring, we can bound the conditional min-entropy of the outputs given the inputs, Hmin(A |X;λ) =
− log2
∑
~x P˜ (~x | λ) max~a P˜ (~a | ~x;λ), as follows (see [24] for a more detailed discussion of the concept of
min-entropy and its relevance in our context):
Hmin(A |X;λ) = − log2
∑
~x
P˜ (~x | λ) max
~a
P˜ (~a | ~x;λ) (14)
= − log2
∑
~x
P˜ (~x | λ)
P˜ (λ | ~x) max~a∈Λ~x P˜ (~a | ~x) (15)
≥ − log2
∑
~x
P˜ (~x)
P˜ (λ)
2−Hthr (16)
≥ Hthr − log2
1
P˜ (λ)
. (17)
In the second line we defined Λ~x as the set of ~a’s such that the event λ occurs given ~x, and in the third
line we used eq. (12) and the fact that nH(V) − ν(~x)η ≥ Hthr by the definition of λ. Comparing P˜ (λ)
to some positive ′ directly implies the following result:
Theorem 1. Let  and ′ be two positive parameters, let Hthr be some threshold, and let λ be the event
that nH(V) − ν(~x)η ≥ Hthr, where V is a 1 −  confidence region according to Definition 2. Then the
behavior PAX is -close to a behavior P˜AX such that, according to P˜AX ,
1. either Pr(λ) ≤ ′,
2. or Hmin(A |X;λ) ≥ Hthr − log2 1′ .
The meaning of this result is as follows. Suppose that we are able to compute a RB function according
to Definition 1 and, from the results (~a, ~x) of n rounds of measurements, a 1− confidence region according
to Definition 2. We may thus compute the value of nH(V) and check whether it is above the chosen
threshold Hthr, i.e., whether the event λ occurred.
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The given physical device that we used to generate the results (~a, ~x) is characterized by an unknown
behavior P . The theorem indirectly characterizes the behavior P , by showing the existence of an -
close behavior P˜ , where  can be chosen arbitrarily small. The probability difference between the two
distributions is thus at most  for any event, and P and P˜ are almost indistinguishable. The theorem
states that, assuming that the event λ occurs, the behavior P˜ is one of two possible kinds.
The first possibility if the event λ is observed is that the conditional min-entropy of P˜ is higher
than Hthr − log2 1′ . This implies that P˜ contains extractable randomness: one can use a randomness
extractor to process the raw outputs ~a and obtain a final string of bits, which is close to uniformly
random according to P˜ and whose size is essentially Hthr − log2 1′ (the length and randomness of the
output string will also depend on a security parameter ext of the extractor itself) [25] . Since P is -close
to P˜ , it follows that the output string will also be essentially uniformly random according to the actual
behavior P of the device (see Section III.D of [14] for details).
The second possibility is that the event λ occurred while being very unlikely: according to P˜ , Pr(λ) ≤
′, and thus, according to P , Pr(λ) ≤ ′+ , where ′ can be chosen arbitrarily small. In this case there is
no guaranteed lower bound on the conditional min-entropy. We cannot, of course, avoid such a possibility.
For instance, a Bell device that simply outputs predetermined bits, which have been chosen uniformly
at random by an adversary, will have zero conditional min-entropy, but may still pass any statistical test
we can devise with some positive probability. Nevertheless, in this case, since λ is unlikely, the impact
on the security of the protocol of (mistakenly) assuming that the conditional min-entropy bound of the
Theorem holds, will be negligible. We refer to Section III.D of [14] for more details on how Theorem 1
translates to a secure randomness generation protocol.
Note that more generally, one can use a sequence of thresholds H0 < H1 < · · · < H`, rather than
a single threshold. Theorem 1 then becomes a set of individual statements, regarding events λi where
nH(V) − ν(~x)η ∈ [Hi, Hi+1[ for i = 0, . . . , ` − 1. This means that the protocol admits intermediate
thresholds of success leading to increasingly better min-entropy bounds, rather than being a single-
threshold, all-or-nothing protocol.
4 Estimation
In this section we explicitly illustrate how to construct a confidence region, according to Definition 2, using
a straightforward estimator for the Bell expectations f [p] and applying the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality,
as proposed in [3]. Note that it is possible to use other (tighter) concentration inequalities than the
Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. In particular, we do not claim our specific choice to be optimal for a finite
number of rounds n.
Let (~a, ~x) be the output-input sequence obtained in a certain realization of the n-round protocol.
We define the observed frequencies as an estimation of the average behavior of the device based on the
observed data,
pˆ(a | x) = #(a, x)
npi(x) , (18)
where #(a, x) is the number of occurrences of the output-input pair (a, x) in the n rounds. As with
probabilities, we refer to the full set of observed frequencies (pˆ(a | x)) as a vector pˆ.
We define resulting estimators for the Bell expressions by substituting pˆ for p in (1):
f [pˆ] =
∑
a,x
f(a, x)pˆ(a | x) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
f(ai, xi)
pi(xi)
. (19)
To ease the notation, in the following we sometimes write fˆ instead of f [pˆ]. It should be kept in mind
that pˆ and fˆ are random variables, being functions of the observed event (~a, ~x).
As shown in [3], a simple application of the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality yields the following result:
Lemma 4. For any α = 1, . . . , t, let ±α > 0 and let
µ±α = γα
√
2
n
ln 1
±α
, (20)
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where
γα ≥ max
p∈Q
max
a,x
∣∣∣∣fα(a, x)pi(x) − fα[p]
∣∣∣∣ . (21)
Then
Pr
 1
n
n∑
j=1
fα[p~aj−1,~xj−1 ] ≤ fˆα + µ+α
 ≥ 1− +α (22)
and
Pr
 1
n
n∑
j=1
fα[p~aj−1,~xj−1 ] ≥ fˆα − µ−α
 ≥ 1− −α . (23)
Lemma 4 simply states that with high probability the n-round average 1n
∑n
j=1 fα[p~aj−1,~xj−1 ], condi-
tioned on the past, is no greater (no smaller) than the observed value fˆα plus (minus) some deviation µ+α
(µ−α ). This deviation tends to zero as 1/
√
n and directly depends on the quantity γα, which represents
an upper bound on the maximum possible value of |fα(a, x)/pi(x) − fα[p]|, that is to say, the maximal
extent to which the random variable fα(a, x)/pi(x) can differ from its expectation fα[p]. In other words,
γα bounds the possible statistical fluctuations which our observations can be subject to. A specific value
for γα is given by
γ˜α = max
{
max
a,x
fα(a, x)
pi(x) −minp∈Q fα[p], maxp∈Q fα[p]−mina,x
fα(a, x)
pi(x)
}
. (24)
The terms maxa,x fα(a,x)pi(x) and mina,x
fα(a,x)
pi(x) are easy to calculate, while the terms maxp∈Q fα[p] and
minp∈Q fα[p] can be computed through SDP using a NPA relaxation [23].
We can combine the above upper and lower bounds for all α through a union bound to get the
following confidence region:
Lemma 5. Given ±α ≥ 0 for α = 1, . . . , t, let fˆ± be the vector (fˆ±1 , . . . , fˆ±t ), where
fˆ±α =
{
fˆα ± γα
√
2
n ln
1
±α
if ±α > 0 ,
±∞ if ±α = 0 ,
(25)
with fˆα as defined in eq. (19) and γα as defined in eq. (21).
Let the confidence region
V = [fˆ−, fˆ+] = {f ∈ Rt : fˆ− ≤ f ≤ fˆ+}. (26)
Then
Pr
 1
n
n∑
j=1
f [p~aj−1, ~xj−1 ] ∈ [fˆ−, fˆ+]
 ≥ 1−  , (27)
where  =
∑t
α=1(+α + −α ).
In eq. (26) the inequalities fˆ− ≤ f ≤ fˆ+—as all other vector inequalities in this paper—should be
understood to hold component-wise, i.e., fˆ−α ≤ fα ≤ fˆ+α for all α.
Note that when +α = 0 (or −α = 0), we are simply not putting any bound on 1n
∑n
j=1 f [p~aj−1,~xj−1 ]
from above (or below). Indeed, it is not always useful to bound a Bell expression from both directions.
Consider, for instance, the CHSH expression. It is well-known that the amount of certifiable randomness
increases with the absolute value of the CHSH violation, increasing from 2 (the maximal local value)
to 2
√
2 (the maximal quantum value) and from −2 (the minimal local value) to −2√2 (the minimal
quantum value). If we are estimating the randomness produced by our Bell device based only on the
CHSH expression fchsh, and strongly expect the CHSH expectation to be in the region [2, 2
√
2], then it is
certainly desirable to lower-bound it as accurately as possible. However, we have no interest in knowing
that it is smaller than some value (since the randomness which can be certified is only affected by the
lower bound in the region). For a given  = +chsh + 
−
chsh, we are therefore interested in setting 
+
chsh = 0,
so that −chsh is as large as possible, and thus fˆ
−
chsh is as close as possible to fˆchsh. However, if we have no
a priori reason to expect the CHSH expression to lie in one region or the other, ±chsh = /2 is the most
natural choice.
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5 Bounding single-round randomness
In Section 3 we showed how to put a bound on the randomness produced by a Bell device which is used
n times in succession, given a RB function H. We now discuss how we can explicitly compute such a
function.
The function H is defined through two properties, as specified in Definition 1. The first one is the
condition that − log2 p(a | x) ≥ H(f [p]) for all a ∈ A, all x ∈ Xr, and all p ∈ Q. The optimal function
satisfying this first condition is simply given by
H˜(f [p]) = min
a∈A,x∈Xr
min
p′
− log2 p′(a | x)
subject to f [p′] = f [p], p′ ∈ Q .
(28)
Alternatively, we can pass the − log2 to the left of the minimizations, which then become maximizations,
and we can thus write H˜(f [p]) = − log2 G˜(f [p]), where
G˜(f [p]) = max
a∈A,x∈Xr
max
p′
p′(a | x)
subject to f [p′] = f [p], p′ ∈ Q .
(29)
The functions H˜ and G˜ defined in this way have an intuitive interpretation. For a fixed behavior p and
a fixed input x, H˜ = mina∈A(− log2 p(a | x)) is simply the min-entropy of the distribution {p(a | x)}a∈A,
while G˜ = 2−H˜ = maxa∈A p(a | x) is the associated guessing probability, i.e., the optimal probability to
correctly guess the output a given that we know that it is drawn from the distribution {p(a | x)}a∈A.
Both these quantities represent measures of the output randomness. However, we are generally interested
in bounding the output randomness not only for a single input x, but simultaneously for a subset Xr
of all the inputs. In addition, we assume in the DI spirit that the full behavior p of our Bell device is
generally not known, and that the device is characterized only by the Bell expectations f [p]. Taking the
worst case of H˜ and G˜ over all inputs x ∈ Xr and all quantum behaviors p compatible with the Bell
expectations f [p] leads to (28) and (29).
The second requirement in Definition 1 is that H should be a convex function. This property is
used in Lemma 1 to bound the randomness produced from n successive measurement rounds. However,
the function defined by (28) is not necessarily convex. For fixed values of a ∈ A and x ∈ Xr, let
us denote H˜a,x(f [p]) the function defined by the interior minimization, i.e., the minimum over p′ ∈ Q
of − log2 p′(a | x) subject to the constraint that f [p′] = f [p]. This is a convex minimization program
and thus the functions H˜a,x(f [p]) are all convex. However, H˜ is obtained by taking the point-wise
minimum H˜(f [p]) = mina,x H˜a,x(f [p]) of these functions, which will generally not be convex (see [20] for
a specific example where this happens). Similarly, the individual functions G˜a,x defined by the interior
maximization in (29) are concave, but G˜ will generally not be.
In order to obtain a convex function, we could simply define a function H∗ as the minimum over
arbitrary convex combinations of the functions H˜a,x, i.e., as the convex hull of (28):
H∗(f [p]) = min
{qa,x,pa,x}a∈A,x∈Xr
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
qa,xH˜a,x(f [pa,x])
subject to qa,x ≥ 0 ,∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
qa,x = 1 ,∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
qa,xf [pa,x] = f [p] .
(30)
Similarly, the concave hull of (29) is
G(f [p]) = max
{qa,x,pa,x}a∈A,x∈Xr
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
qa,xG˜a,x(f [pa,x])
subject to qa,x ≥ 0 ,∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
qa,x = 1 ,∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
qa,xf [pa,x] = f [p] .
(31)
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Note that it is not true any more that H∗ = − log2G, but it is easy to see that H∗ ≥ H = − log2G.
Though the function H∗ defined through (30) is the tightest function satisfying the constraint of
Definition 1, it is not easy to deal with numerically because of the presence of the logarithms in the
definitions of H˜a,x. We will thus instead use the lower-bound H = − log2G, which obviously satisfies
the first condition of Definition 1 (since H∗ ≥ H) as well as the second one (since G is concave and
nonnegative, H = − log2G is convex). The interest is that the optimization problem (31) is simpler to
evaluate than (30). Note first that (31) can be re-expressed as follows by absorbing the weights qa,x in
the unnormalized quantum behaviors p˜a,x = qa,xpa,x:
G(f [p]) = max
{p˜a,x}a∈A,x∈Xr
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
p˜a,x(a | x)
subject to
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
Tr[p˜a,x] = 1,∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
f [p˜a,x] = f [p],
p˜a,x ∈ Q˜ ∀a ∈ A,∀x ∈ Xr .
(32)
In the above formulation, Q˜ denotes the set of unnormalized quantum behaviors, the conditions qa,x ≥ 0
and pa,x ∈ Q are equivalent to the single condition p˜a,x ∈ Q˜, and the condition
∑
a,x qa,x = 1 becomes∑
a,x Tr[p˜a,x] = 1 where Tr[p] =
∑
a p(a | x) is the norm of p (the expression Tr[p] is independent of the
choice of x, and it is equal to 1 for normalized behaviors). Problem (32) cannot be solved in general since
the set Q˜ is hard to characterize, but it can be replaced with one of its NPA relaxations, in which case
it becomes a SDP (since apart from the condition p˜a,x ∈ Q˜ all constraints and the objective function are
linear). This will in general only yield an upper bound on the optimal value G (and thus a lower bound
on H∗), but this is entirely sufficient for our purpose.
In the case where the set Xr contains a single input x, the optimization problem (32) is essentially
identical to the one introduced in [19, 20] and corresponds to maximizing an adversary’s average guessing
probability over all possible quantum strategies (the difference with [19, 20] is that we characterize the
devices through an arbitrary number of Bell expectations f [p], rather than a single Bell expression or
the full set of probabilities p(a | x)). The general form (32), however, also applies to the case where Xr
contains more than one input and represents one possible way to characterize the randomness of a subset
of inputs (other suggestions have been made in [20]; the main reason for the present choice is that it
satisfies the mathematical properties that are needed in our n-round analysis). In the following, we refer
to the function G given by (32) as the guessing probability of the behavior characterized by f [p].
To apply our n-round analysis, we actually do not need to compute the value H(f [p]) = − log2G(f [p])
for a fixed value f [p], but instead its worst-case bound over all quantum behaviors p ∈ Q for which
f [p] ∈ V. If the confidence region V is defined as an interval [fˆ−, fˆ+], as in the preceding section, this
can simply be cast as the following optimization problem:
G([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = max
{p˜a,x}a∈A,x∈Xr
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
p˜a,x(a | x)
subject to
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
Tr[p˜a,x] = 1,
fˆ− ≤
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
f [p˜a,x] ≤ fˆ+,
p˜a,x ∈ Q˜ ∀a ∈ A,∀x ∈ Xr.
(33)
Again this problem admits a SDP relaxation through the NPA hierarchy. When [fˆ−, fˆ+]∩ f [Q] = ∅, the
optimization problem is infeasible. In accordance with Definition 1, in that case we let G([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = 1
or H([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = 0.
We conclude this discussion by noting that in specific cases such as that of [3], where f is a single
CHSH expression, the symmetries under relabelings of inputs and outputs imply that the formulations
(28), (29), (30), and (31) are equivalent, since (28) is already convex. In such cases, our RB function is
the tightest function that satisfies Definition 1, by virtue of (28) being the tightest function that satisfies
condition 1 of the Definition.
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In the Appendix, we provide more intuition about the above problems by considering their dual
formulations. We also discuss in more detail their link with [19, 20].
6 Summary of the protocol
In the two preceding sections, we have specified a way of bounding the randomness within a (1 − )
confidence region V = [fˆ−, fˆ+] around the observed statistic f [pˆ]. We can thus apply Theorem 1 to
bound the min-entropy of the output string obtained after n uses of the device. Processing this raw
string with a suitable extractor finally leads to a uniformly random and private string. The resulting
protocol is summarized in Figure 1.
Arguments:
• D(k,X ,A): a Bell device as described in Section 2, consisting of k black boxes taking joint
inputs in X and producing joint outputs in A.
• Xr ⊆ X : a subset of all inputs (ideally this set should contain the inputs from which we expect
to obtain the most randomness).
• pi(x): the distribution of inputs at each round.
• f = {fα}α=1,...,t: the t Bell expressions used to estimate the device behavior.
• {γα}: an upper bound on statistical fluctuations, defined in eq. (21).
• n: the number of measurement rounds.
• l: the level of the NPA relaxation used to solve the randomness-bounding SDP.
• Hthr: the threshold used to determine if the protocol succeeds or aborts.
• , ′: the two security parameters involved in Theorem 1. The parameter  should itself be
decomposed into the 2t parameters ±α such that  =
∑
α 
−
α + +α .
Protocol:
1. Operate the device n rounds in succession: at each round j, choose the k-tuple of inputs xj
according to distribution pi(xj) and obtain the k-tuple of outputs aj . After n rounds obtain
the input-output string (~x,~a).
2. Determine
(a) the confidence region V = [fˆ−, fˆ+], defined by equations (25)-(26), which depends on
(~x,~a), {γα}, {±α } and n;
(b) ν(~x), the number of inputs not in Xr, defined by eq. (5).
3. Calculate H(V) = − log2G(V) as defined in program (33) and using level l of the NPA
hierarchy.
4. Determine whether nH(V)− ν(~x)η is above the threshold Hthr
(a) if not, abort;
(b) if yes, apply a (m,h, ext)-extractor, where m is the extractor output length, h = Hthr −
log2 1′ is the min-entropy bound given by Theorem 1, and ext the extractor’s security
parameter (see [14]).
Figure 1: DIRNG protocol following from Theorem 1 (Section 3) and from the results of Sections 4, 5.
As we noted in Section 3, one can define a similar protocol based on a sequence of thresholds H0 <
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H1 < · · · < H` rather than a single one, introducing intermediate levels of success in the protocol. One
advantage of this is that we do not need to determine what threshold we expect the device to reach
and risk failing the protocol with high probability if we overestimated Hthr. See Section III.D of [14] for
details.
7 Discussion
We have introduced a family of protocols, each characterized by a choice of t Bell expressions fα, a
randomness-generating input set Xr, and an input distribution pi(x). This family contains as a special
case the protocols introduced in [3, 14, 15], which correspond to the case where a single Bell expression
f is used (t = 1) and where the randomness-bounding function covers all inputs (Xr = X ). The main
novelty introduced in the present work is that we can take into account information from more Bell
expressions (t ≥ 1) and can tailor the randomness analysis to a subset of all possible inputs (Xr ⊆ X ).
In order to discuss these new aspects, in the following sections we illustrate our protocol on a concrete
example. The scenario in this example has two parties (k = 2), two measurement settings per party
(X = {0, 1}2), and two outcome possibilities per measurement (A = {0, 1}2). We consider a device
behavior
p = vpext + (1− v)u (34)
for v = 0.99, arising from a mixture of white noise u and the extremal quantum behavior pext that achieves
maximal violation of the Iβ1 tilted-CHSH inequality introduced in [21], with β = 2 cos(2θ)/
√
1 + sin2(2θ)
for θ = pi/8. The tilted-CHSH expression is defined as
Iβ1 = β〈A0〉+ 〈A0B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉+ 〈A1B0〉 − 〈A1B1〉 . (35)
The extremal behavior can be achieved by a pair of partially entangled qubits |φ〉 = cos θ |00〉+ sin θ |11〉
measured with observables
A0 = σx , A1 = σz , (36a)
B0 = cosµσz + sinµσx , B1 = cosµσz − sinµσx , (36b)
with tanµ = sin 2θ. (Note the difference in notation from [21]: we relabelled the inputs 1 and 2 to 0 and
1, respectively.)
The resulting correlations have the property of giving more predictable outcomes for a subset of
measurement inputs. For θ = pi/8, the two measurement settings that give more predictable outcomes,
x = (0, 0) and x = (0, 1), have a guessing probability of about 0.775 in the ideal (v = 1) case where Iβ1 is
maximally violated. On the other hand, the two measurement settings with less predictable outcomes,
x = (1, 0) and x = (1, 1), have guessing probabilities of about 0.496.
In the analysis of randomness, we will consider two choices for the randomness generating subset Xr:
the full input set Xr = X and the more restricted choice Xr = {(1, 0)}, which is one of the two settings
that give less predictable measurements in pext.
Furthermore, we will estimate three different Bell expressions, all defined in terms of the following
correlators:
〈Ax1〉 =
∑
a1,a2,x2∈{0,1}
(−1)a1pi2(x2 | x1)p(a1a2 | x1x2) x1 ∈ {0, 1}, (37a)
〈Bx2〉 =
∑
a1,a2,x1∈{0,1}
(−1)a2pi1(x1 | x2)p(a1a2 | x1x2) x2 ∈ {0, 1}, (37b)
〈Ax1Bx2〉 =
∑
a1,a2∈{0,1}
(−1)a1+a2p(a1a2 | x1x2) x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}. (37c)
The weights pi1(x1 | x2) and pi2(x2 | x1) represent the two conditional local input distributions defined
with respect to the joint input distribution pi(x1x2).1
1Note that for a no-signaling behavior, we could equivalently use any arbitrary set of probability weights in place
of pi1(x1 | x2) or pi2(x2 | x1). We choose this specific set of weights because it provides a better estimator for the
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The expressions we will evaluate are the CHSH expression
Ichsh = 〈A0B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉+ 〈A1B0〉 − 〈A1B1〉 , (38)
the tilted-CHSH expression Iβ1 (35) and the “optimal” expressions for the chosen device behavior (34):
Ip = 10.610− 1.859 〈A0〉 − 1.733 〈A1〉+ 0.499 〈B0〉 − 2.196 〈B1〉
− 3.109 〈A0B0〉 − 2.945 〈A0B1〉 − 2.610 〈A1B0〉+ 4.343 〈A1B1〉
(39)
and
Iallp = 3.131 + 0.126 〈A0〉 − 0.428 (〈B0〉+ 〈B1〉)
− 0.673 (〈A0B0〉+ 〈A0B1〉)− 1.002 (〈A1B0〉 − 〈A1B1〉) .
(40)
These last two Bell expressions are “optimal” Bell expressions in the following sense. As already observed
in [19, 20], the dual of problem (32) (see eq. (51) in the Appendix), when applied to a device characterized
by its full behavior (i.e., fa,x[p] = p(a | x) so that f [p] = p), finds a Bell expression Ip such that the
amount of randomness certified from Ip[p] with respect to the measurement setting x = (1, 0) is equal
to the amount of randomness that can be certified from the entire table of probabilities p(a | x) (again,
with respect to the measurement x = (1, 0)). Thus, to each device behavior p is associated a single Bell
expression Ip that is optimal for p from the point of view of randomness.2 Likewise, Iallp is defined with
respect to all inputs x ∈ X rather than the subset {(1, 0)}.
7.1 Bounding randomness for all inputs with one Bell expression (Xr = X ,
t = 1)
Before discussing the novelties introduced in this work, let us start by briefly reviewing the case t = 1
and Xr = X , which corresponds to the protocols introduced in [3, 14, 15]. In this case, ν(~x), the
number of inputs not in Xr, is always equal to zero, and according to Theorem 1, the min-entropy of the
output string is roughly equal to nH(V). Furthermore, the confidence region V reduces to a confidence
interval [fˆ−, fˆ+] around the estimated Bell violation fˆ . Usually, the values of fˆ that we expect to
obtain in the protocol will fall in a region where H(fˆ) is either monotonically increasing or decreasing
with fˆ , i.e., the interval is within either the upward- or downward-sloped region of the convex function
H(fˆ). For instance, if f is the CHSH expression, we may assume that the devices have been designed
so that with very high probability fˆ ≥ 2. In that region, H(fˆ) is indeed increasing with fˆ (i.e., the
randomness increases for increasing values of the CHSH expression). Let us assume for definiteness that
H is increasing (the same kind of reasoning can be done if H is decreasing). Since we are looking for the
minimal value of H in the region V (see Lemma 2), it is then sufficient, as done in [3, 14, 15], to take a
one-sided interval [fˆ−,∞[, and the minimal value of H in the interval will then be H(fˆ−). Considering
again our CHSH example, we are interested in a guarantee that the CHSH value is above some threshold,
which determines the randomness we can certify in the worst case, but it is useless to know that it is
bounded from above (see also discussion at the end of Section 4). Taking the definition eq. (25) for fˆ−,
we thus get that the min-entropy of the output string is bounded (roughly speaking3, and up to the
marginal correlators 〈Ax1 〉 and 〈Bx2 〉 when applied to the observed frequencies pˆ(a1a2 | x1x2). Indeed, it can be seen
from the definition of a Bell estimator f [pˆ] in eq. (19) that the marginal correlators reduce to a natural definition based
on locally available data resulting only from the respective party’s interaction with their part of the device, namely,
〈Ax1 〉 =
∑
a1
(−1)a1#(a1, x1)/(npi1(x1)), and similarly for 〈Bx2 〉.
2More accurately, there exist infinitely many Bell expressions that are equivalent to Ip up to terms that vanish for no-
signaling behaviors. In order to pick one that tolerates the small signaling fluctuations present in our behavior estimator
pˆ, we run the computation of Ip in the 8-dimensional space of correlators, rather than the overspecified 16-dimensional
parametrization of quantum behaviors in terms of the probabilities p(a1a2 | x1x2). We translate this expression back to
a unique standard form (1) using definition (37) for the correlators. This ensures that the solution to the dual program
(51) picked by our solver among many equivalent expressions does not contain terms that blow up under small signaling
fluctuations. See also [26] for a finer analysis of noise tolerance in equivalent Bell expressions.
3Equation (41) and the similar approximate bounds that follow should be understood as informal statements giving
an order of magnitude for the min-entropy lower bound. Contrary to the statement of Theorem 1, this informal bound
directly involves the estimator fˆ , which is a random variable. As such, it might be subject to improbable but extreme
fluctuations, in which case the bound does not correctly characterize the device. In comparison, the min-entropy bound of
Theorem 1 is expressed in terms of a fixed threshold. Furthermore, the Theorem also accounts for the unlikely event that
a device reaches this threshold only by chance.
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− log2(1/′) correction) as
Hmin & nH
(
fˆ − γ
√
2
n
ln 1

)
. (41)
This is precisely the result of [3, 14, 15], whose interpretation is quite intuitive: the min-entropy after
n runs is equal to n times the min-entropy for a single run, evaluated on the observed Bell violation fˆ
offset by a statistical parameter µ = γ
√
(2/n) ln(1/). This correction accounts for the fact that even if
a device has been built such that it produces a target Bell violation, statistical fluctuations may push
the observed violation above what is expected.
This statistical correction depends on the security parameter  and decreases with the number of
runs n. It also depends on the prefactor γ defined in eq. (21). This prefactor depends on the choice of
Bell expression f , and also importantly on the input distribution pi(x).
As discussed in [3, 14], the input distribution can be suitably chosen to optimize the ratio Rout/Rin
of the randomness that is produced to the randomness that is consumed when choosing the inputs. The
idea is that if at each run one selects with very high probability a given input x = x∗, then the resulting
distribution pi(x) can be sampled from a small number of initial uniform bits Rin, which should improve
the ratio Rout/Rin. However, this will also lower Rout because observations involving the other inputs
x 6= x∗ will be less frequent, which will reduce the statistical accuracy. Consider for instance, as in [3, 14],
the case where the input x∗ is chosen with probability pi(x∗) = 1−κn−δ for some constants κ and δ, and
the other inputs are chosen with probability pi(x) = κ′n−δ, where κ′ = κ/(|X | − 1) for normalization.
Then the initial randomness Rin required to choose the inputs according to this distribution will be of
size O(n1−δ lnnδ) (i.e., roughly n times the Shannon entropy of the input distribution, see Theorem 2
in [14]). On the other hand, according to eq. (41), the output randomness will be of size Ω(n) as long as
the statistical correction, of order γ/
√
n, remains bounded by a constant. Since, according to eq. (21),
γ ' 1/(minx pi(x)) we get that the statistical correction is of order γ/
√
n = O(nδ− 12 ) and thus that we
should take δ ≤ 12 . We can thus hope at best a quadratic expansion wherein O(n
1
2 lnn 12 ) initial bits are
consumed and Ω(n) are produced.
Note that the initial randomness for choosing the inputs only needs to be random with respect to
the devices, but can be publicly announced to the adversary without compromising the privacy of the
output string [14, 27]. One can thus view the above protocols as producing private randomness from
public randomness. From this perspective, the “expansion” efficiency of the protocol is less relevant
since the final and initial randomness correspond to different resources that do not necessarily have to
be compared on the same footing.
We generated random samples of n input-output pairs ~a, ~x from the behavior p corresponding to
equation (34) with the following input distribution
pi(x) =
{
1− 32n−1/5 if x = (1, 0) ,
1
2n
−1/5 otherwise.
(42)
Note that as n grows, the input distribution becomes strongly biased to select x = (1, 0) most of the
time.
We performed this sampling independently for different values of n between 100 and 3 × 1018. For
each value of n, we repeated this sampling 300 times in order to show the variation of our result over
several simulations.
The corresponding min-entropy rate bound (that is, (41) divided by n) for  = 10−6 is represented in
Figure 2 as a function of the number of runs n for different Bell expressions. The curves in this plot and
the ones that follow (Figures 2–5) show the values for the first simulation out of the 300, and the range
of values taken over all 300 simulations is drawn as a shaded area behind each curve. In some instances,
usually for high values of n, the area is invisible, which indicates a negligible variation across simulation
runs. All curves are obtained by solving the program (33) in its dual form (56) (see Appendix) at level 2
of the NPA hierarchy. All optimizations were performed using the Matlab toolboxes Yalmip [28] and
SeDuMi [29].
As we can see, the expression Iβ1 gives the worst results. The reason for this is that the inequality is
suited to the extremal behavior pext rather than the imperfect behavior we simulated (i.e., in equation
(34), the case of perfect visibility v = 1 rather than v = 0.99). On the other hand, the expression
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Figure 2: Bounds on min-entropy rate Hmin/n (eq. (43)) with Xr = X , for a varying number of mea-
surement runs n and for different Bell expressions. Note that for Xr = X , the error term ν(~x)η/n equals
zero. The protocol is simulated for the device behavior p in eq. (34) as explained in Section 7.1. The
dashed and dotted lines represent the min-entropy H(p) associated to the behavior p, respectively for
Xr = {(1, 0)} and Xr = X . The dash-dotted line represents the min-entropy H(Iβ1 [p]) for Xr = X given
the expectation value of the tilted-CHSH expression Iβ1 .
Iallp is tailored to our illustrative behavior (34); it thus gives asymptotically optimal results for Xr = X
according to [19, 20]. There is, however, no reason for it to be optimal for finite, low values of n. Indeed,
we observe that the CHSH expression, while not specially suited to the behavior of our device, yields a
better performance for values of n lower than 1010. The CHSH expression appears actually to be a good
randomness certificate for all values of n, as it only performs slightly worse than Iallp asymptotically.
7.2 Bounding randomness for a subset of all inputs (Xr ⊆ X )
Having reviewed the case t = 1 and Xr = X , we proceed to consider the modifications introduced in this
work. We consider first the possibility Xr ⊂ X . This means that the RB function H is only required to
non-trivially bound the output probability for inputs that are in the set Xr. This is an important feature
because for many Bell expressions the randomness that can be certified depends on the input used. For
instance, maximal violation of the tilted-CHSH inequalities may imply that the randomness is maximal
for one input pair but near zero for another input pair [21]. Using a function which is simultaneously
randomness-bounding for all inputs x ∈ X would then be highly sub-optimal in this case. This aspect is
particularly important for photonic implementations of DI protocols: recent photonic Bell tests rely on
partially entangled states [30–33], for which the optimal extraction of randomness requires the use of a
specific input.
According to our analysis, in the case Xr ⊆ X , the bound (41) becomes
Hmin & nH
(
fˆ − γ
√
2
n
ln 1

)
− ν(~x)η , (43)
where H is now a RB function for Xr, which will generally yield an improvement over a RB function that
is required to be valid for all of X . Our analysis, however, introduces a penalty term of the form ν(~x)η,
where η ≤ log2|A| is bounded by a constant and ν(~x) is the number of inputs not in Xr that have been
observed.4 To keep this penalty term as low as possible, we should choose inputs in Xr¯ = X \ Xr with
a low probability. One possibility, compatible with our previous discussion about the introduction of a
4Note that in certain cases, the RB function may be insensitive to the choice of Xr. For instance, in the case of the
CHSH inequality, which is highly symmetric, putting all inputs on the same footing, any RB function returns the same
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Figure 3: (Top) Penalty term in the min-entropy rate bound for different number of measurement rounds
n. (Bottom) Bounds on min-entropy rate Hmin/n (eq. (43)) for a varying number of measurement runs n,
for different Bell expressions and for different input subsets Xr. The protocol is simulated for the device
behavior p in eq. (34) as explained in Section 7.1. The dashed and dotted lines represent the min-entropy
H(p) associated to the behavior p, respectively for Xr = {(1, 0)} and Xr = X . The dash-dotted line
represents the min-entropy H(Iβ1 [p]) for Xr = {(1, 0)} given the expectation value of the tilted-CHSH
expression Iβ1 .
bias in the input distribution, is to take pi(x) = κ′n−δ for x ∈ Xr¯, in which case the expected value of
ν(~x) would be |Xr¯|κ′n1−δ. This is negligible asymptotically with respect to the main term of (43), which
is Ω(n), provided that δ > 0. The input distribution (42) chosen for our numerical example satisfies this
requirement.
The corresponding min-entropy rate bound (that is, (43) divided by n) for  = 10−6 and η = log2|A| =
2 is represented in Figure 3 as a function of the number of runs n, for different Bell expressions and for
two choices of Xr.
Figure 3 shows that in spite of the penalty term, which quickly vanishes as n grows, the bound on the
entropy rate for Xr = {(1, 0)} for the expressions Iβ1 and Ip (the analogue of Iallp for this restricted Xr)
is significantly better than the values obtained with Xr = X . This clearly shows the value of using the
restricted randomness-generating input set Xr = {(1, 0)}. In particular, by combining this with the use
of the optimal expression Ip corresponding to behavior (34), one can asymptotically reach the theoretical
value H(p) of the min-entropy (represented by the dashed line in Figure 3). Furthermore, whereas using
the Iβ1 expression with Xr = X yields worse values than using the CHSH expression, taking Xr = {(1, 0)}
yields an asymptotic entropy rate for the Iβ1 expression which is higher than using the CHSH expression.
As mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, this is because Iβ1 is not adapted to bound randomness
independently of the input (i.e., Xr = X ) [21].
Similarly to the difference between the curves corresponding to Iallp and I
β
1 for Xr = X , the difference
bound on the randomness independently of the choice of Xr, and in particular when Xr = X . Thus the choice of Xr will
not impact the main term of (43) but only the penalty term, which will vanish if |Xr¯| = 0. In such situations, it is therefore
preferable to take Xr = X , as in [3, 14].
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between the asymptotic entropy rates reached by using the expressions Ip and Iβ1 for Xr = {(1, 0)} is
caused by the imperfect visibility parameter v = 0.99 in the simulated behavior (34).
Making the right choice of Bell expression and input subset Xr depends not only on the device, but
also on the value of n. Indeed, while Ip is an optimal expression for certifying randomness in this specific
device with respect to the input subset Xr = {(1, 0)}, this is only the case asymptotically. For small n,
Figure 3 suggests that the CHSH expression has a better resistance to statistical fluctuations than the
other expressions we considered, regardless of Xr.
Note that we did not attempt to optimize the choice of input distribution and it is possible that a
different choice of pi(x) would lead to better bounds in Figure 3 for the two curves with Xr = {(1, 0)}.
7.3 Bounding randomness from several Bell expressions (t ≥ 1)
As we have seen, the right choice of a single Bell expression in the analysis of randomness is not straight-
forward, except for large values of n where Ip becomes optimal. In this regime, it would seem perfectly
admissible to perform tests on the device before running the actual randomness generation protocol,
in order to estimate p and use this information to find an “optimal” Bell expression Ip′ as described
above, which can afterwards be used in the randomness generation protocol proper. However, there are
disadvantages to this method.
Firstly, to find an expression Ip′ that performs comparably to the optimal Ip for the device behavior
p, we must know p to a sufficiently high accuracy. In a black box scenario where imperfections cannot be
ruled out, this means that a significant number of measurements must be performed in order to evaluate
the behavior to great precision. Since the Bell expression needs to be fixed in advance of the protocol,
those evaluation rounds cannot be taken from measurement rounds of the protocol and must instead be
thrown away. In addition, the behavior of the devices may vary in time, unlike our i.i.d. choice (34), due
to drifts in the experimental set-up for example. In that case, one would need to periodically estimate
p and rederive the corresponding optimal Bell expression on some subset of the measurement data that
needs to be thrown away. Finding an expression Ip′ also requires methods of inference of the behavior
of the device from a finite sample: indeed, the estimated behavior (18) cannot be used directly to find a
candidate Ipˆ, as pˆ almost always violates the no-signaling conditions. There exist different approaches
to this inference (see for instance [20, 34–37]), so a nontrivial choice must be made.
Finally, even ignoring the problem of estimating the unknown behavior p, the associated data loss, or
the drift of p over time, we saw in the previous section and in Figure 3 that the choice of a Bell expression
is not straightforward when considering different values of n. For example, the asymptotically optimal
expression Ip as formulated in [19, 20] is generally not the best for low values of n. There is thus no
general method to guide the choice of a Bell expression for a given n.
In order to avoid the above problems associated to the use of a single Bell expression,5 we now turn
to the second element introduced in this work: the possibility to estimate the randomness from t > 1
Bell expressions, and in particular from the full set of observed frequencies of occurrence pˆ = {pˆ(a | x)}
as defined in eq. (18).
When we have more than one Bell expression, the bound (43) generalizes to
Hmin & nH
(
[fˆ−, fˆ+]
)
− ν(~x)η , (44)
where the one-dimensional interval [fˆ−,∞] has simply been replaced with the multidimensional region
[fˆ−, fˆ+]. As before the limits of the region depend on the security parameter , the constants γα, and
they become smaller with the number of runs n (see equations (25) and (26)).
Increasing the number of Bell expressions can have both beneficial and detrimental consequences.
We can reach an understanding of this by considering the optimization problem (33) that defines
H([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = − log2G([fˆ−, fˆ+]). This problem essentially evaluates the randomness of a certain quan-
tum behavior p such that fˆ− ≤ f [p] ≤ fˆ+. Each vector component of this constraint defines two affine
5Note that another issue is the choice of a randomness-generating input set Xr. The set Xr maximizing the randomness
generation rate depends obviously on the underlying behavior p, but also on the number of rounds n, as illustrated in
Fig. 3. In practice, setting Xr could be the result of an informed choice based on prior information about the behavior of
the devices or a rough estimate of it made before running the protocol. It is reasonable to expect, as we do in our numerical
simulation, that the optimal set Xr is only weakly sensitive to fluctuations or drifts of the experimental set-up, since it
takes its value from a discrete set. The use of a fixed set Xr is thus less problematic than the use of a fixed Bell estimator.
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Figure 4: Bounds on the min-entropy rate Hmin/n (eq. (44)) for a single Bell expression (Ichsh or Ip),
and for a “complete” set of 8 expressions. The protocol is simulated for the device behavior p in eq. (34)
as explained in Section 7.1. The dashed and dotted lines represent the min-entropy H(p) associated to
the behavior p, respectively for Xr = {(1, 0)} and Xr = X .
constraints, fˆ−α ≤ fα[p] ≤ fˆ+α , restricting the set of values p can take in the optimization. From a
geometrical point of view, for each α = 1, . . . , t, this defines two parallel hyperplanes in the space of
behaviors, delimiting a region between them which we call a slab. The full constraint fˆ− ≤ f [p] ≤ fˆ+
defines a polytope in the space of behaviors which is the intersection of the t slabs.
The optimization (33) identifies the worst-case bound on randomness for quantum behaviors inside
this constraint polytope. We would therefore like to restrict this region as much as possible given a
value of the confidence parameter . We thus see that adding Bell expressions is generally beneficial, as
it cuts the constraint polytope into a smaller volume. However, as stated in Lemma 5, the confidence
parameter  in the protocol is shared between all 2t parameters ±α , as
∑t
α=1(+α +−α ) = . A consequence
of this is that the more Bell expressions we have, the smaller ±α are on average. Since smaller values of
±α give thicker slabs (see equation (25)), if we are distributing  evenly across all ±α for instance, this
amounts to a dilation of the constraint polytope in optimization (33). Nevertheless, since the width of
the slab depends on ±α only through a factor
√
ln(1/±α ), we will typically find that this negative effect
is outweighed by the positives of adding more Bell expressions, and the randomness bound is globally
improved.
This improvement is illustrated in Figure 4, where we reconsider the numerical example presented
in Section 7.1. We now use 8 Bell expressions that are equivalent (for quantum behaviors) to the
specification of the 16 probabilities p(a1a2 | x1x2) (we will explain why we use this choice of 8 Bell
expressions later).
In the case Xr = {(1, 0)}, we see that the randomness that we can extract with multiple Bell expres-
sions is similar to the use of the optimal expression Ip alone for about n ≥ 1010 runs, but much better
for smaller numbers of runs. In fact, the improvement is even better in practice, even in regions where
the use of 8 Bell expressions gives the same rate as Ip, because in plotting the rate for Ip we knew the
exact behavior p from which the measurement runs are sampled. In a real experiment (in particular
with drifts over time), we would instead need to infer the behavior p at regular intervals from auxiliary
measurements and throw away the corresponding data. In contrast, the method based on the full set
of observed frequencies achieves the same or better randomness extraction without throwing away any
data.
In the case Xr = X , the use of 8 expressions is comparable to that of CHSH and, as with Ip above,
it outperforms the Iallp expression (not shown in Figure 4; see Figure 2 or 3). For small values of n,
the CHSH expression keeps a small advantage. This can be understood from the fact that the CHSH
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expression itself is part of the set of 8 expressions that we used in Figure 4. The difference between
the two curves therefore results from a trade-off between a better estimation of randomnes from more
expressions and the negative effect of wider margins ±α in the confidence region.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss in more detail how to choose a good set of Bell expressions
for the protocol. For this, let us start by considering our protocol when n→∞. In this asymptotic limit,
the interval [fˆ−, fˆ+] narrows down towards the point fˆ = f [pˆ(a | x)], which is just the value of the t Bell
expressions f computed on the experimentally observed frequencies pˆ(a |x). If the bias towards inputs in
Xr is appropriately chosen (as discussed previously), then the relative contribution of the penalty term
vanishes as n→∞ and the bound (44) becomes in the asymptotic limit, up to sublinear terms,
Hmin & nH(fˆ) . (45)
Furthermore, in the case where the device behaves in an i.i.d. way according to a behavior p, then,
asymptotically, fˆ → f [p]. If one chooses enough Bell expressions as to fully characterize the behavior of
the devices (for instance, by using an estimator for each probability p(a | x)), fˆ thus becomes equivalent
to the knowledge of p and the above bound converges to the maximal min-entropy bound one can obtain
from p given Xr, as characterized in [19, 20]. In this sense, and as seen in Figure 4, our protocol is
asymptotically optimal.
Note that there are different sets of Bell estimators that are asymptotically equivalent to the knowl-
edge of the full set of probabilities p(a | x). For instance in a bipartite Bell experiment with two inputs
and two outputs there are 16 probabilities p(a | x) = p(a1a2 | x1x2) with a1, a2, x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1} and thus
16 associated Bell expressions e1, . . . , e16 defined by eα[p] = p(a1a2 | x1x2), with one value of α for each
of the possible values of (a1, a2, x1, x2). But since the probabilities p(a | x) satisfy normalization and no-
signaling, they are uniquely specified by the 8 correlators of eq. (37), which constitute 8 Bell expressions
g1, . . . , g8, where g1 and g2 are the first party’s two marginal correlators 〈Ax1〉, g3 and g4 are the second
party’s 〈Bx2〉, and g4, . . . , g8 are the four bipartite correlators 〈Ax1Bx2〉.
Alternatively, the probabilities are also equivalent to the 8 expressions h1, . . . , h8 with hα = gα for
α = 1, . . . , 4, and hα for α = 5, . . . , 8 are four linearly independent permutations of the CHSH expression,
generalizing (38):
Iy1,y2chsh =
∑
x1,x2∈{0,1}
(−1)(x1+y1)(x2+y2)〈Ax1Bx2〉 y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}. (46)
As we increase the number of rounds, all these possible choices become equivalent, since the intervals
[eˆ−, eˆ+], [gˆ−, gˆ+], [hˆ−, hˆ+] define constraint polytopes in the space of behaviors p that asymptotically
intersect the quantum set at the same unique point. However, the choice of one set of estimators over
another could make a difference for finite n.
Generally speaking, when choosing which Bell expressions to use for a fixed number t, we may prefer
that as many of them as possible be linearly independent. Consider t − 1 Bell expressions and their
associated slabs, which define a constraint polytope. In the absence of any meaningful information
concerning the behavior of the objective function of (33) within its feasible set, the choice of a t-th
Bell expression should be dictated by the resulting reduction of the constraint polytope: cutting a large
volume out is more likely to reduce the maximum of (33). As n grows large and the slabs grow thinner,
the best way to reduce this volume is to choose a Bell expression that is linearly independent from the
t− 1 previous ones, if possible. We can easily understand this in the asymptotic limit: as we mentioned
above, the optimization converges to H(fˆ), and with enough linearly independent Bell expressions, f [pˆ]
uniquely defines pˆ, hence H(fˆ) = H(pˆ). At this point, adding more expressions only makes f [pˆ] a more
redundant definition of pˆ, which does not improve the randomness bound. On the other hand, with too
few independent Bell expressions, fˆ = f [pˆ] is compatible with many values of pˆ, and the worst value is
what ends up determining H(fˆ).
In addition, we see that there is no need for Bell expressions that are purely signaling, i.e., that have
a constant value for all no-signaling behaviors p. Indeed, since the feasible region of (33) is defined by
the intersection of the slabs and the quantum set, constraints deriving from purely signaling expressions
are trivial in this region, and therefore do not contribute to improve the randomness bound.
Combining these two conclusions also indicates that we should avoid Bell expressions that are only
linearly dependent up to purely signaling terms. This implies for instance that the sets g1, . . . , g8 or
h1, . . . , h8 should be preferred over e1, . . . , e16. This is indeed what we find, as illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Bounds on the min-entropy rateHmin/n (eq. (44)) with Xr = {(1, 0)} for three (asymptotically)
equivalent sets of Bell expressions. The protocol is simulated for the device behavior p in eq. (34) as
explained in Section 7.1. The dashed line represents the min-entropy H(p) associated to the behavior p
for Xr = {(1, 0)}.
Note that the sets g1, . . . , g8 and h1, . . . , h8 only differ by a linear transformation, but the second set
yields better results for the same (finite) number of rounds n. With respect to optimization (33), this
means that the feasible set for h1, . . . , h8 excluded the optimum obtained for g1, . . . , g8. This might be
related to the fact that in this scenario of two parties with two inputs and two outputs, the four versions
of the CHSH inequalities constitute the facets that separate local from nonlocal behaviors, and they
might therefore serve as better measures of nonlocality and randomness than the correlators 〈Ax1Bx2〉.
This phenomenon can be visualized in a simpler instance where two Bell expressions are used, namely,
I0,0chsh and I
0,1
chsh. In Figure 6, we represent the RB function G(I
0,0
chsh[p], I
0,1
chsh[p]) with respect to a single
input Xr = {(0, 0)}, as defined in eq. (31). The figure shows the evolution of the randomness bound, from
a trivial value of 1 for values of I0,0chsh[p] and I
0,1
chsh[p] compatible with a local hidden variable model, to
nontrivial values up to approximately 0.32 reached at extremal points. The variation of the RB function
along these two axes is not trivial, but as we can see, the gradient mostly points along the directions of
the CHSH axes, with the exception of the regions where the local and quantum boundaries meet. To
minimize this variation within a confidence region of fixed square shape in this plane, it is best to rotate
the interval so that its sides are aligned with the gradient. Aligning the confidence region with the two
CHSH axes is therefore a sensible choice in this case.
8 Conclusion and open questions
In recent years several protocols for generating randomness in a DI way have been introduced [2–17],
with varying degrees of security, rate of randomness expansion, or noise robustness. They all, however,
share the feature that they rely on the estimation of a single Bell expression.
As was shown in [19, 20], in an idealized setting in which the behavior of the devices is known and
fixed, more randomness can in principle be certified if one takes into account the violation of several Bell
inequalities, or, even better, the full set of probabilities characterizing the devices’ behavior.
We have shown here that a similar reasoning applies in the context of an actual DIRNG protocol,
where randomness is directly certified from experimental data. Specifically, we have combined the anal-
ysis of [19, 20] with the protocol introduced in [3, 14, 15], which generates certified randomness against
an adversary with classical side information. We have in this way obtained a family of DIRNG protocols
which rely on the estimation of a choice of t ≥ 1 Bell expressions. This includes the special case where
the randomness is directly certified from the knowledge of the relative frequencies of occurrence of the
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Figure 6: RB function G(f1, f2) according to (31) for Xr = {(0, 0)}, with f1 = I0,0chsh and f2 = I0,1chsh, as
defined in (46). The set of local behaviors projected onto this plane defines a square region, represented
with a dotted line. The quantum set Q projects into the circular region (I0,0chsh[p])2 + (I0,1chsh[p])2 ≤ 8 [38].
Note that while this RB function is centrally symmetric, it is not symmetric under reflection through
either CHSH axis. The function was computed by solving the optimization program (31) at level 2 of
the NPA hierarchy.
outputs given the inputs. Asymptotically, for a given Xr, this results in an optimal generation of ran-
domness from experimental data (as measured by the min-entropy) without having to assume beforehand
that the devices violate a specific Bell inequality and without the need to infer the device behavior from
preliminary measurements. Furthermore, in the non-asymptotic case, the choice of an optimal Bell ex-
pression is ambiguous even if the device behavior is perfectly characterized. Our method proposes a way
of bypassing this problem by directly evaluating the randomness from the observed output frequencies.
Our protocol also provides a way of treating the case where the randomness of the outcomes of the
devices is much higher for some inputs than for others. This happens in particular when generating
randomness from partially entangled states [21], which are used in present photonic loophole-free Bell
experiments [32, 33]. Our analysis essentially amounts to consider that all the randomness has been
generated from the optimal set of inputs, but corrected by a penalty term that is proportional to the
number of events corresponding to non-optimal inputs. By biasing the choices of inputs towards the
optimal ones, one can make this penalty term negligible asymptotically. However, for small numbers of
measurement runs, we have seen that this procedure may be less efficient than an analysis based on a
Bell expression that treats all inputs on the same footing, like the CHSH expression. It is possible that
our way of treating non-optimal inputs could be improved, leading to more efficient protocols for small
numbers of measurement runs.
Our result could be generalized in several ways. First, how to prove security against quantum side
information when several Bell expressions or the full set of data generated in the experiment are taken into
account? This is not a priori easy to answer since the analysis of most DIRNG protocols secure against
quantum side information rely on Bell expressions with a particular structure [6, 8, 11] or, when they
allow for arbitrary Bell expressions, do not optimally take into account the observed level of violation [17].
Second, we based the statistical analysis on the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality, but alternative deviation
theorems [39] could be adapted to our setting. Our attempt at improving our bounds using a tighter
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concentration inequality from Hoeffding [40] (called McDiarmid’s inequality in [39] after [41]) produced
no visible difference in the plots. Another alternative, Bentkus’ inequality [39, 42], involves discrete
summations with around n terms, which would grow too large in our simulations to be used as-is.
Finally, we note that since DIRNG is not the only task where information from several Bell estimators
can be exploited, a similar approach could be developed for other DI problems, such as DI quantum key
distribution.
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A Appendix
The problems introduced in Section 5 are typical instances of conic programming. A conic program is
an optimization problem of the form
maximize
{xi}
k∑
i=1
〈ci, xi〉
subject to
k∑
i=1
Aixi = b
xi ∈ Ki i = 1, . . . , k ,
(47)
where b ∈ Rm, xi, ci ∈ Rni , Ai ∈ Rm×ni , and Ki are closed convex cones (i = 1, . . . , k). Here 〈c, x〉
denotes the usual scalar product 〈c, x〉 = ∑nj=1 cjxj between vectors in Rn and a set K is a convex cone
if q1p1 + q2p2 belongs to K for any nonnegative scalars q1, q2 ≥ 0 and any p1, p2 in K.
In other words, an optimization problem is a conic program if it involves the maximization of a linear
function of the optimization variables given linear constraints on such variables and the condition that
they belong to a certain family of cones. Many familiar convex optimization problems, including linear
and semidefinite programming, are instances of conic programming.
The problems (32) and (33), and their NPA relaxations, are also conic programs. Indeed, the set of
unnormalized behaviors Q˜ and all of its NPA relaxations are clearly cones and all other constraints in
(32) and (33) are linear in the variables p˜a,x. As we said earlier, the NPA relaxations of these problems
actually correspond to a specific type of conic programs, i.e., semidefinite programs.
Any conic program in the primal form (47) admits a dual formulation given by [46]
minimize
y
〈b, y〉
subject to ATi y − ci ∈ K∗i i = 1, . . . , k
(48)
where y ∈ Rm and K∗i = {zi ∈ Rni : 〈zi, xi〉 ≥ 0, ∀xi ∈ Ki} is the dual cone of Ki. Let α denote the
value of the primal program (47) and β the value of the dual program (48). Then the strong duality
theorem of conic programming says that if the primal program is feasible, has finite value α, and has
points x˜i ∈ int(Ki) such that
∑k
i=1Aix˜i = b, then the dual program is feasible and has finite value β = α
[46].
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Let us determine the dual of the optimization problem (32). From now on, we take generically Q˜
to denote the cone of unnormalized quantum behaviors or any of its NPA relaxations, as the analysis is
identical in both cases.
Let us first rewrite (32) in a form similar to (47). For this, define cax ∈ R|A|×|X| as the vector with
components cax(a′, x′) = δaa′δxx′ . Thus 〈cax, p〉 = p(a | x). Let b = (1, f1[p], . . . , ft[p]) ∈ R1+t. Let u be
any Bell expression such that u[p] = Tr[p] for all no-signaling behaviors p, for instance u(a, x) = δx,x0
for some input x0 ∈ X . Let Aax be matrices in R1+t,|A|×|X| with components [Aax]1,a′x′ = u(a′, x′) and
[Aax]1+α,a′x′ = fα(a′, x′) for α = 1, . . . , t. Then
G(f [p]) = max
{p˜a,x}a∈A,x∈Xr
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
〈cax, p˜a,x〉
subject to
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
Aaxp˜a,x = b
p˜a,x ∈ Q˜ ∀a ∈ A,∀x ∈ Xr.
(49)
The dual is then readily given as
G(f [p]) = min
y∈R1+t
〈b, y〉
subject to ATaxy − cax ∈ Q˜∗ ∀a ∈ A,∀x ∈ Xr ,
(50)
where Q˜∗ is the dual cone of Q˜, that is, the set Q˜∗ = {c ∈ R|A|×|X| : 〈c, p˜〉 ≥ 0, ∀p˜ ∈ Q˜}. Note that
this dual cone can be identified with the set of Tsirelson inequalities for normalized behaviors, that is,
the set Q∗ = {(d0, d) ∈ R1+|A|×|X| : 〈d, p〉 ≤ d0, ∀p ∈ Q}. Indeed, note that by normalization 〈u, p〉 = 1
and thus an inequality 〈d, p〉 ≤ d0 valid for p ∈ Q can always be rewritten in the form 〈(d0u− d), p〉 ≥ 0,
hence in the form 〈c, p〉 ≥ 0 for some suitable c. But an inequality 〈c, p〉 ≥ 0 is clearly valid for Q if and
only if it is valid for Q˜.
Using the explicit form of b, Aax, and cax and the above interpretation of Q˜∗, we can rewrite the
dual (50) as
G(f [p]) = min
y∈R1+t
y0 +
t∑
α=1
yαfα[p]
subject to p′(a | x) ≤ y0 +
t∑
α=1
yαfα[p′] ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ Xr, ∀p′ ∈ Q.
(51)
The interpretation of this dual problem is immediate. We are seeking an affine function y0 +
∑
a yαfα[p]
satisfying the condition 1 in Definition 1—this is the constraint line of the optimization problem (51).
Since the function is affine, it is also concave and the condition 2 in Definition 1 is also trivially satisfied.
We are then searching for the best function of this form, i.e., the one that gives the lowest possible value
(i.e., the most randomness) for the given Bell expectations f [p]. Note that considering an affine function
is actually not a restriction because the optimal function G(f [p]) is concave, and therefore it is equivalent
to the envelope of its tangents, which are affine functions of f [p].
From the point of view of implementations, the condition that p′(a | x) ≤ y0 +
∑
α yαfα[p′] is valid
for Q can be cast as a search for a sum-of-squares decomposition of this inequality. When Q is one of
the NPA relaxations of the quantum set, this is equivalent to solving a certain SDP, which turns out to
be, as expected, the dual of the original NPA problem.
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Let us now determine the dual of the noisy problem (33), which we can rewrite as
G([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = max
{p˜a,x}a∈A,x∈Xr
τ ,κ∈Rt
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
p˜a,x(a | x)
subject to
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
Tr[p˜a,x] = 1∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
f [p˜a,x] + τ = fˆ+∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
f [p˜a,x]− κ = fˆ−
p˜a,x ∈ Q˜ ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ Xr
τ ,κ ∈ Rt+ .
(52)
Again, let us rewrite in a form similar to (47). For this, define b ∈ R1+2t = (1, fˆ+1 , . . . , fˆ+t , fˆ−1 , . . . , fˆ−t ).
Let Aax be matrices in R1+2t,|A|×|X| with components [Aax]1,a′x′ = u(a′, x′) and [Aax]1+α,a′x′ = fα(a′, x′)
as above, and [Aax]1+t+α,a′x′ = fα(a′, x′), for α = 1, . . . , t. Additionally, we define two matrices A1, A2
in R1+2t,t through [A1]1,α = 0, [A1]1+α,α′ = δα,α′ , [A1]1+t+α,α′ = 0 and [A2]1,α = 0, [A2]1+α,α′ = 0,
[A2]1+t+α,α′ = −δα,α′ for α, α′ ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Then
G([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = max
{p˜a,x}a∈A,x∈Xr
τ ,κ∈Rt
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
〈cax, p˜a,x〉
subject to
∑
a∈A,x∈Xr
Aaxp˜a,x +A1τ +A2κ = b
p˜a,x ∈ Q˜ ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ Xr
τ ,κ ∈ Rt+ .
(53)
The dual is then readily given as
G([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = min
v∈R1+2t
〈b, v〉
subject to ATaxv − cax ∈ Q˜∗ ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ Xr
AT1 v,A
T
2 v ∈ Rt+
(54)
or, writing v = (v0, v1, . . . , vt, v′1, . . . , v′t)
G([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = min
v∈R1+2t
v0 +
t∑
α=1
vαfˆ
+
α +
t∑
α=1
v′αfˆ
−
α
subject to v0u+
t∑
α=1
(vα + v′α)fα − cax ∈ Q˜∗ ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ Xr
vα ≥ 0, v′α ≤ 0 ∀α = 1, . . . , t .
(55)
Defining (y0, y+α , y−α ) = (v0, vα,−v′α) and yα = vα + v′α = y+α − y−α , we can reformulate this as
G([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = min
(y0,y+,y−)∈R1+2t
y0 +
t∑
α=1
y+α fˆ
+
α −
t∑
α=1
y−α fˆ
−
α
subject to p′(a | x) ≤ y0 +
t∑
α=1
yαfα[p′] ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ Xr, ∀p′ ∈ Q
yα = y+α − y−α , y+α , y−α ≥ 0 ∀α = 1, . . . , t .
(56)
This dual formulation is analogous to (51) and can be understood in the same way. The difference lies
in the objective function.
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Although (56) is the best way to express the optimization for a numerical implementation, we may
further simplify its expression by noting that, for a fixed value of y0 and {yα}, the objective function is
minimized when y+α = yα if yα ≥ 0 and y−α = −yα if yα ≤ 0 (in short, y±α = (|yα| ± yα)/2). We can then
write the objective function as
y0 +
∑
α:yα≥0
yαfˆ
+
α +
∑
α:yα<0
yαfˆ
−
α , (57)
and further as the following maximum:
max
f∈[fˆ−,fˆ+]
y0 +
∑
α
yαfα . (58)
Indeed, the maximum will clearly be attained at one of the extreme points of the region [fˆ−, fˆ+], whose
components are of the form f±α . If yα ≥ 0, the maximum will be attained when fα is equal to fˆ+α , if
yα ≤ 0, when it is equal to fˆ−α . All in all, (56) can thus be rewritten as the nested optimization
min
(y0,y)∈R1+t
max
f∈[fˆ−,fˆ+]
y0 +
t∑
α=1
yαfα
subject to p′(a | x) ≤ y0 +
t∑
α=1
yαfα[p′] ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ Xr, ∀p′ ∈ Q .
(59)
In (56), we are thus solving a problem completely analogous to (51) except that the objective function
now yields a bound on G(f) that holds on the entire region [fˆ−, fˆ+]. Since we minimize the objective
function, we are searching for the best possible such bound.
Now, since the extreme points of [fˆ−, fˆ+] are not necessarily quantum (i.e., do not necessarily belong
to f(Q)), one could expect this upper bound to be strictly higher than the optimal quantum bound in
[fˆ−, fˆ+], contrarily to the primal formulation (33). But this is not the case, as follows from the duality
property of conic programs. As we mentioned, the strong duality theorem for conic programs [46] ensures
that the value of the dual (59) matches that of the primal (33), as long as the primal has a strictly feasible
point. That is, a set of subnormalized probability vectors {p˜a,x} should exist such that all the equality
constraints of the optimization are satisfied, and which lie in the interior of their respective cones, i.e.,
p˜a,x ∈ int(Q˜) for all a ∈ A, x ∈ Xr. We argue that when the primal is not infeasible, this is almost
always the case.
Consider the set f [int(Q)], that is, the set of Bell value vectors that are compatible with a non-
extremal quantum behavior. If the intersection of this set with the confidence region [fˆ−, fˆ+] is non-null,
we have strict feasibility of (33). Indeed, let p ∈ int(Q) be a behavior such that f [p] ∈ [fˆ−, fˆ+]. Then,
any decomposition of p as a sum of points in int(Q˜), for instance p˜a,x = p/(|A| × |Xr|), gives a strictly
feasible point for (33).
On the other hand, if the closure f [Q] has no intersection with [fˆ−, fˆ+], then the primal (33) is
infeasible and the dual (59) diverges to −∞, as a rather straightforward application of the hyperplane
separation theorem shows.
The last possibility is that f [int(Q)] has a point of tangency with [fˆ−, fˆ+] or, in terms of separating
hyperplanes, that there exist {y0, yα} such that
∑
α yαfα > y0 for all f ∈ f [int(Q)], and
∑
α yαfα ≤ y0
for all f ∈ [fˆ−, fˆ+]. In this case, there might only exist non-strictly feasible points for the primal, while
the dual does not diverge. Without strong duality, there is no guarantee that the two resulting values
are the same. However, this case is irrelevant to us, as the chances that the confidence region [fˆ−, fˆ+]
around our estimated frequencies is tangent to f [int(Q)] are essentially zero.
Thus, in practice, the primal is either infeasible or it is strictly feasible. Hence, when the dual (59)
converges, we can safely conclude strong duality, and the optimum of the dual is indeed not worsened
by allowing the dual to select f /∈ f [Q], since the same value as computed by the primal (33) is achieved
by a feasible point {p˜a,x} such that G([fˆ−, fˆ+]) = G(f [p]) with p =
∑
a,x p˜a,x ∈ Q.
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